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THE TRANSACTIONAL DYNAMICS OF
MARKET FRAGILITY
MATTHEW JENNEJOHN*
I
INTRODUCTION
One way to frame the post-Cold War era of U.S. economic history is as a
revolution in contract design. If the vertically integrated company was the
hallmark of the mid-twentieth century economy, then complex contractual
arrangements are the essence of early twenty-first century economic
organization. Contractual innovation underpins everything from the rise of
private equity to the financial products that precipitated the 2008 financial crisis.
Contract’s revolutionary role has not, however, been isolated to Wall Street.
The less glamorous world of procurement has also undergone a similar
transformation. The time where the modal procurement transaction involved a
routine call, to be later memorialized in a purchase order, by a purchasing
manager at a large conglomerate to the sales office at a supplier to request a
shipment of commodity parts is a largely distant memory.
Supply relationships are less unidimensional now. Before, a significant
amount of production was handled in-house at the vertically integrated
manufacturer, and so procurement was rather straightforward, limited largely to
raw materials or other commodities. That changed as growing global product
market competition caught producers between demands for faster technological
innovation and rapid cost reduction. Many producers responded by “deverticalizing.”1 Mid-century corporate monoliths simultaneously shed
subsidiaries, exiting the internal production of sub-systems, and expanded their
contractual relationships with suppliers. Replacing internal production with
contractual relationships gave producers both greater access to technological
innovation and flexibility. Instead of developing a product internally, one could
buy it from a third-party supplier fully invested in innovating in their area. And,
if the development relationship did not work out, then the supplier could, more
or less, be replaced. As a result, vast and carefully articulated supply chains grew.
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The thousands of suppliers, sub-suppliers, and sub-sub-suppliers from all corners
of the world developing systems for Boeing’s commercial airplanes are a
canonical example.
Shifting production to contractual relationships introduces new types of risk,
however. Just as new contractual innovations brought us the financial products
that fueled crisis a little over a decade ago,2 the contractual remaking of modern
supply chains has resulted in profound social costs.
We experienced particularly tragic versions of those costs as COVID-19
closed production facilities around the world in early 2020. As the supply of key
components was disrupted, lifesaving items, such as masks and other protective
materials, were scarce. Disruptions spread across the exchange networks on
which modern life relies, amplifying the consequence of outbreaks in different
localities. In a word, the distributed markets of twenty-first century capitalism
can be extremely “fragile,” in the sense that they are systemically sensitive to
disturbances.
Proposals for improving market resilience fall into a number of categories.
Economic commentary has focused upon re-verticalizing production within firms
and, relatedly, re-shoring production within national boundaries. Others argue
that public lending—ad hoc versions of which were deployed during the
pandemic to shore up struggling companies—should play a larger role. Appetite
on both sides of the U.S. bipartisan divide for industrial policy has been renewed,
a possibility all but unthinkable a decade ago.
Potential solutions may also be found within the institution on which modern
production networks are built: contracting. For instance, an array of longstanding
excusal
doctrines
in
Anglo-American
contract
law—impossibility,
impracticability, and frustration of purpose—might also play a role here. Force
majeure provisions, which parallel the law’s default excuse doctrines, are also
relevant. Perhaps legal institutions might operate as a distributed system for
relieving the financial distress that arises when disruptions ripple along a supply
chain.
Which of those policy options should we pursue? One of the challenges of
calibrating prescriptions for improving market resilience is accurately diagnosing
market fragility. We have a general notion that shocks propagate through
exchange networks, but the details of diffusion are elusive. For instance, what
determines when a shock is likely to have a widespread impact on a production
network? When will the effect of a shock be more isolated? Answering those
important questions would allow us to more clearly understand the strengths and
weaknesses of the policy and doctrinal proposals currently under consideration,
and to appreciate how they may work together—or at cross-purposes.
This Article takes a step toward more clearly diagnosing market fragility for
the purpose of developing better policy choices that anticipate and address future
crises. It does so by connecting two erstwhile and distinct literatures: the legal
2. Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1229–30 (2012).
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scholarship on relational contracting and the social science on the diffusion of
shocks in economic networks. This Article attempts to connect the strategies
parties pursue in designing their agreements—a familiar topic to contract
scholars—to the diffusion patterns observed in disrupted markets—an
increasingly important area of study in macroeconomics. By investigating that
intersection, this Article introduces a new potential policy domain for
remediating market fragility: Contract design.
To summarize, Part II of this Article reviews the fundamentals of networks
and how they are studied. Part III discusses recent research on the scale of private
ordering and the potential costs of contractual networks. Part IV argues that two
choices that commercial parties make while designing a transaction affect
diffusion patterns. First, the network of exchanges in which a shock diffuses
reflects market participants’ choices of contracting partners. Whom one chooses
to deal with, and their relative position in the network, can have important social
consequences. Second, investing in bilateral governance, such as by choosing a
relational contract rather than a discrete arm’s-length arrangement for a supply
relationship,3 can act like a shock absorber for disruptions in a market.4 In that
respect, the flexibility of relational contracting, typically understood in terms of
the pros and cons it presents in the bilateral context of an agreement, may also
have broader social benefits.5 Part IV also describes how the choice between
arm’s-length and relational contracting in turn affects who parties choose to
partner with. In that respect, the details of transaction design are critical for a
complete understanding of the origins of market fragility.
The Article concludes in Part V by reflecting upon potential implications for
policy. Two initial lessons are drawn. First, although market contagion is an
externality, and as such a natural subject for regulatory intervention, it presents
a wickedly complicated landscape for a regulator to navigate. Although further
empirical research is necessary to deepen our understanding of shock
propagation in a variety of exchange networks, it is clear enough that any policy
response must engage with a diversity of diffusion patterns that may be difficult
to anticipate. Market fragility is not uniform across the economy, and so any
policy response must be contingent and flexible. Second, given that complexity,

3. Of course, one of the key teachings of prior contracts scholarship is that nearly all deals are
relational in some respect. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 855 (1977–1978)
(expanding on “highly relational patterns” in contract law). The degree to which agreements are
relational does, nevertheless, often differ across transactions and markets more broadly, with some being
more discrete and others more relationally embedded.
4. The argument that contract design can affect the propagation of distress in a market is similar
in spirit to the argument advanced by Kathryn Judge, though the supply chain context focused upon here
is different than the financial markets central to Judge’s study. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes:
A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012).
5. Relational contracting is the subject of a massive literature spanning a number of adjacent
disciplines. For an excellent review of the scholarship, which highlights the costs and benefits of relational
contracting, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, A Paradigm Shift in Comparative Institutional Governance: The Role
of Contract in Business Relationships and Cost/Benefit Analysis, 2021 WIS. L. REV. 385 (2021).
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improving contract design might be a useful ex ante prophylactic measure that
promotes resilience in environments where ex post regulatory intervention may
struggle to gain purchase.
II
FROM DESIGNING DEALS TO NETWORK EMERGENCE
While it is natural to refer to the contractual relationships underpinning the
production of many contemporary products as supply chains, it is more accurate
to think of them as supply networks. Much production is more interwoven than a
simple chain analogy captures. It may help then, at the outset, to establish some
common concepts used to study networks.6
A. Network Fundamentals
Economic networks emerge from interactions among participants in a market
over time.7 Those interactions may take a variety of forms, from individuals
having jobs at an organization to stockholders owning shares of a company to the
supply chains focused upon here. Of course, in many cases, different types of
interactions overlap—participants in a market may have not only trading
connections between one another but also social relationships.8 The interactions
of primary interest in the supply chains here are contractual connections, which
arise as consideration is exchanged and risks allocated between parties to an
agreement. Those contracts are the primary conduits by which a shock—such as
the outbreak of a pandemic, a factory fire, an earthquake, et cetera—spreads in
a market. A shock interferes with a supplier’s performance, that supplier
breaches its contractual obligations to a buyer, that in turn leads the buyer to
breach on its contractual commitments to the customers to whom it sells, and so
on.
In the parlance of network analysis, contracting parties are the vertices or
“nodes” of an exchange network. And the agreements they enter into are the
edges or “links” that connect those nodes. As one party executes a contract with
another party, a simple network emerges. For instance, imagine that a large
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) enters into manufacturing agreements
with two upstream suppliers for the production of a sub-system. This simple
example could reflect contracts Ford Motor Company has with suppliers. The
simple network that results is visualized in Figure 1 below:

6. This is not meant to be a complete primer, but rather a brief introduction. For an excellent
treatment of network fundamentals, see generally MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
NETWORKS (2008).
7. See generally JOHN F. PADGETT & WALTER W. POWELL, THE EMERGENCE OF
ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS (2012).
8. See, e.g., John F. Padgett, Transposition and Refunctionality: The Birth of Partnership Systems
in Renaissance Florence, in THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS 171 (John F. Padgett
& Walter W. Powell eds., 2012) (analyzing economic, kinship, and political ties among the renaissance
Florentine finance elite).
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Figure 1: Illustrative Diagram of Hypothetical Contractual Network

As time passes, that simple network can grow more complex. For instance,
imagine that the OEM signs a second deal with Manufacturer B and enters into
a licensing deal with a company that specializes in research & development. The
updated network is reflected in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Illustrative Diagram of Network Emergence

And so on. As contractual relationships accrue over time, that simple network
can grow quite large.
As one might imagine, the massive global markets of the twenty-first century
can lead to the emergence of enormous networks. One of the industries where
we can see such scale is the biopharmaceutical industry, for which publicly
available data on contractual relationships is readily available, unlike many other
sectors.9
The contractual network that has emerged in biopharmaceuticals is massive.10
9. Public data on biopharmaceutical contractual relationships is by no means complete. However,
a significant amount of visibility can be achieved because many biopharmaceutical companies file their
material contracts with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as part of their reporting
requirements as publicly traded companies. Because even small biopharmaceutical companies are often
publicly traded, contracts that large companies might deem immaterial are nevertheless disclosed—
because they are material to a smaller entity. The upshot is that thousands of R&D agreements, supply
agreements, M&A agreements, and financing agreements are publicly available in the biopharmaceutical
industry, while only a fraction of contracts can be found publicly in other sectors.
10. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell, Douglas R. White, Kenneth W. Koput & Jason Owen-Smith,
Network Dynamics and Field Evolution: The Growth of Interorganizational Collaboration in the Life
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Figure 3 below depicts the global network of contractual relationships in the
biopharmaceutical industry from 1995 through 2015.11 Over 32,000 contracts (the
links in the network), involving over 15,000 parties (the nodes in the network),
are captured in the graph.12
Figure 3: Biopharmaceutical Contractual Network, 1996–2015

B. Studying Network Topology
Having identified the nodes and links of the biopharmaceutical network, we
can then study the characteristics of its structure or “topology.” This can be
analogized to studying a map that provides information about the topological
characteristics of a certain geography.
The first thing one might do with a topological map is find the location of a
place of interest—a town, a campsite, or a landmark, for instance. We can do the
same with a network. That is, we can study the relative positions of any given
node within the network. For example, a common metric is calculating a node’s
“centrality.”13 The idea can be intuited from Figure 3 above: Links in the

Sciences, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1132, 1157 (2005) [hereinafter Powell et al., Network Dynamics and Field
Evolution] (analyzing contractual connections in the biopharmaceutical industry); Walter W. Powell,
Kenneth W. Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116 (1996) [hereinafter Powell et
al., Interorganizational Collaboration] (describing the biotechnology industry’s “large-scale reliance on
interorganizational collaborations”).
11. This data is more thoroughly analyzed in Matthew Jennejohn, Do Networks Govern Contracts?,
J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2022).
12. Most agreements involved two parties, but a small percentage of contracts involved three or
more distinct organizations. Of course, there are other types of connections between companies in the
network besides formal contracts. For instance, there are professional and personal relationships among
the scientists, academics, executives, and lawyers at the companies and institutions involved in the
biotechnology industry.
13. There are an abundance of centrality measures available in network analysis. Perhaps the
simplest is total degree centrality, which simply tallies the number of links for each node in a network—
nodes with more links have greater total degree centrality. For further discussion of other common
centrality measures, see JACKSON, supra note 6, at 37–43.
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biopharmaceutical network are not uniformly distributed among nodes, and thus
some companies in the network are more central—they have more links—while
others are more peripheral—they have fewer links. Incidentally, Pfizer has the
most contractual connections in the network with 2,360 links to other companies.
Second, we may want to study the relationship between two, or more, places
of interest. We may want to find a path from a campsite to a landmark, for
instance. We can also do this with a network. Quite literally, we can trace the
path between any two nodes, and we can analyze the qualities of any given link
within the network. As an example, links can be directed to reflect the flow of
goods or the allocation of risk from one party to another. Or they may be
weighted to reflect the number of contracts between two companies, since deals
often repeat between participants in many markets. Or we might differentiate
links between, say, arm’s-length contracts and more relational contracts that
interweave two companies. For instance, if the contracts depicted in Figure 2
above follow the typical trends in the biopharmaceutical industry, the agreements
between the OEM and Manufacturers A and B will have some relational
elements to them but generally be more discrete than the more collaborative
arrangement between the OEM and the R&D company.14
Finally, we may want to study the overall characteristics of the geographic
region we are interested in—its changes in elevation or the grouping of particular
things such as a forest of trees or suburbs around a city. Again, we can do this
also with networks by characterizing their overarching structure.
In the study of social networks, of which the economic networks of interest
here are a subset, few networks are “complete”—that is, all possible links
between nodes are present. Rather, in most economic networks, like the
biopharmaceutical network above, links between nodes are unevenly distributed.
As noted above, this gives nodes unique positions within a network relative to
other nodes. But it also gives networks unique structures.
For instance, the links between nodes might be randomly allocated.15
Although this rarely happens in social settings, random networks are a useful
benchmark—a null hypothesis that a network has no structure—against which to
compare an actually occurring network that is of interest.
More likely is that we find an economic network whose links follow a more
discernable attachment pattern. For example, a core-periphery structure may
form where nodes prefer to connect with certain nodes over other nodes,

14. See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 337–
53 (2016) (explaining the variables affecting the formation and nature of relational contracts).
15. A random network, sometimes called an Erd s-Rényi (E-R) network, is generated in one of the
two following ways. The first method for generating an E-R network is to consider all graphs that have
݊ nodes and  ܯedges. Thus ݊(ܩ,  )ܯis simply one of the possible graphs chosen at random. The second
and more common method is to connect nodes randomly. Thus ݊(ܩ,  )is a graph with n nodes where
each potential edge is included with a probability , independent of every other edge. The degree
distribution of the nodes in this second type of E-R network is approximated by a Poisson distribution.
Consequently, E-R networks are often referred to as Poisson random networks.

JENNEJOHN (DO NOT DELETE)

288

4/24/2022 7:53 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 85: 281

resulting in some nodes serving as hubs in the network.16 A “scale-free” network
is a particularly extreme version of this structure, where a single highly connected
node has daisy chains of links to other nodes.17 Or perhaps an economic network
will exhibit “small-world” characteristics, which involves local clustering among
nodes but also relatively average path lengths from one node to another in the
network.18 This local clustering may occur in situations where links are formed
between nodes with similar characteristics, an attachment pattern known as
homophily.
Real-world networks rarely match stylized network structure with perfect
fidelity. Consider, for instance, the biopharmaceutical network visualized in
Figure 4 above. Biopharmaceutical companies rarely contract with a
circumscribed group of partners repeatedly. Rather, companies routinely search
far and wide for new partners, who may have new technology or ideas that could
result in the next big blockbuster drug. Researchers have likened it to a dance
ball, where dancers constantly move around the room to find new partners.19
Biopharmaceutical companies’ persistent search for novel partners results in
a single large, highly interconnected network of relationships among companies.
It is not a series of tiny clusters of companies isolated from one another, like a
small-world network. Rather, the biotechnology industry is a single
interconnected network with a core and a periphery. Some companies, which are
found at the center of the network, have many connections with other companies.
Most companies, however, have far fewer connections; the majority only have
one or two links to other firms.
As is discussed in the following Parts, the structure of contractual networks is
beginning to occupy an important role in contract theory. Prior research has
focused primarily upon the role networks may play in the use of informal
enforcement institutions, as discussed in Part III. However, a relatively

16. Albert-László Barabási & Réka Albert, Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks, 286 SCI.
509, 510–11 (1999).
17. Id.; see infra Figure 4.
18. See Duncan J. Watts & Steven H. Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks, 393
NATURE 440, 441 (1998) (illustrating small-world networks in contrast to regular and random network
models). Small-world networks are named after the small-world phenomenon first described by Stanley
Milgram. In his experiments, Milgram sent packages to randomly selected individuals in the Midwest
with basic information about a target contact in Boston. They were asked to send the package directly to
that person if they knew them on a first-name basis. Otherwise, they were to think of someone they knew
on a first-name basis that would be more likely to know the target. The average path length of the letter
chains that were successful was around five and a half or six, leading to the “six degrees of separation”
known in popular culture. Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 2 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61 (1967).
19. See, e.g., Powell et al., Network Dynamics and Field Evolution, supra note 10, at 1138; see also
Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaborations, supra note 10, at 142 (1996) (concluding that “the locus
of innovation is found within the networks of interorganizational relationships that sustain a fluid and
evolving community”). In related work, Powell and Owen-Smith find that the central firms in
biotechnology are an “open elite” with heterogeneous characteristics, a phenomenon that facilitates
“crosstalk among a diverse set of organizations.” Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, An Open Elite:
Arbiters, Catalysts, or Gatekeepers in the Dynamics of Industry Evolution?, in THE EMERGENCE OF
ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS 467 (John F. Padgett & Walter W. Powell eds., 2012).

JENNEJOHN (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2022]

4/24/2022 7:53 PM

TRANSACTIONAL DYNAMICS

289

unexplored possibility, particularly in legal scholarship, is that network structure
also affects the way financial shocks propagate through a market.
III
THE GROWING ROLE OF NETWORKS IN CONTRACT THEORY
Networks have long attracted the attention of contract scholars, but the focus
has been almost entirely on their role in bilateral governance—particularly the
role of networks in informal sanctions. Informal sanctions are typically available
in markets where deals between contracting parties repeat. Repeated deals are
the basis for what scholars call bilateral sanctions: A repeat player can credibly
threaten to end a commercial relationship, which discourages bad behavior.20 If
that repetition occurs evenly within a homogenous, or “closely-knit,” trading
community, then a repeat player has a second enforcement tool: Credibly
threatening to disparage a poorly behaving counterparty’s reputation in the
market.21 In either case, it is the prospect of sanctions being applied in a
subsequent transaction that disciplines behavior in the current deal. In his famous
work on medieval Maghribi merchants, Greif refers to this as “intertransactional
linkage.”22 Linking transactions through repeated dealings between two parties
creates the stability required for consistent norms to emerge and allows an
aggrieved party to punish an opportunistic counterparty, such as by terminating
the relationship.23 In summary, the enforcement of contractual obligations may
be extra-legal.
A. The Scale of Private Ordering
For decades, much scholarship assumed that the role of reputational
sanctions was limited to insular trading communities, where social connections
20. Peter Moran, Structural vs. Relational Embeddedness: Social Capital and Managerial
Performance, 26 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1129 (2005); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 63–64 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115 (1992) (describing the diamond industry’s rejection of “statecreated law” in favor of “an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive institutions and
sanctions to handle disputes among industry members.”).
22. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM
MEDIEVAL TRADE 29 (2006); see also Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in
Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993) (exploring the “implicit
contractual relations” of medieval European merchant guilds).
23. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic
Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902, 917–31 (1998) (discussing the dynamics and strategic implications
of punishment in the context of the extralegal enforcement of transactions); W. Bentley MacLeod &
James M. Malcomson, Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment, 57
ECONOMETRICA 447 (1989) (examining “self-enforcing implicit contracts” in the realm of employment);
W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of
Employment, 96 J. POL. ECON. 832, 849–51 (1988) (explaining how employment termination contracts
can be made “entirely self-enforcing, with no need for legal enforceability”); L. G. Telser, A Theory of
Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980) (investigating the conditions by which incompleteness in
contracts prove optimal).
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were tight.24 However, in two important recent papers, Bernstein argues that the
scale of informal enforcement in relational contracting is greater than prior
scholarship has appreciated. The core claim is that the reputational sanctions
observed in closely-knit cliques are also available in large markets, where
reputational sanctions amplify bilateral threats to stop dealing in the future.25 In
the second paper, Bernstein then adds an important corollary: A small-world
network structure promotes the information flows upon which this expanded
informal governance relies.26
Bernstein introduces the network governance thesis in the context of heavy
equipment supply chains.27 Based on interviews with subjects originally identified
in sociologist Josh Whitford’s excellent study of collaboration among heavy
equipment suppliers in the upper Midwest of the United States,28 Bernstein finds
qualitative evidence that suppliers operate within a network of relationships that
limits the risk of opportunistic behavior by amplifying reputational sanctions.29
The potency of those informal sanctions varies according to parties’ centrality
within the network—more centrally located parties are more constrained by the
possibility of reputational sanctions.30 For instance, interviewees note that an
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that has many connections is
constrained from opportunistically invoking at-will termination provisions in its
formal agreement with a supplier. The news of doing so would quickly spread
through the network, and other suppliers would demand a premium from that
OEM in the future.31
Bernstein’s recent work opens bracing new possibilities in the private

24. A small cottage industry of ethnographic studies has arisen, from sovereign debt to tuna
merchants in Tokyo to 11th century Jewish merchants in North Africa to organized crime to land courts
in Papua New Guinea. See Sadie Blanchard, Courts as Information Intermediaries: A Case Study of
Sovereign Debt Disputes, 2018 BYU L. REV. 497 (2018) (discussing the role of courts as arbiters of
reputational sanctions); Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish
Market, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (2006) (explaining how the tight-knit community of tuna fishermen use a
highly specialized, efficient state-created court to resolve commercial disputes); GREIF, supra note 22
(examining the linkages of European merchant guilds); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark
Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
41, 58–60 (2000) (arguing that organized crime syndicates act as reputational intermediaries competing
with the state to enforce property rights); Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts
of Papua New Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759 (1991) (exploring how land courts use intricate, local
customs to adjudicate property disputes among kin).
25. Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 562, 563–64 (2016).
26. Lisa Bernstein, Contract Governance in Small World Networks, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1009, 1014–
15 (2019).
27. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 562–65.
28. JOSH WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE
ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING 51–117 (2005).
29. Bernstein, supra note 25, at 578–86.
30. Id. at 604–06.
31. Id. at 605 (arguing that reputational information circulating within the network “has the
potential to damage the OEM’s reputation. . . . Misbehaving OEMs may be charged a higher price to
reflect the perceived risk of dealing with them”).
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ordering literature. An informal governance mechanism that appeared isolated
to niche trading communities may be available in a wide range of markets. The
scale of private ordering may be much larger than we assumed.
B. The Overlooked Potential Costs of Contractual Networks
Less appreciated, however, are the potential costs that contractual networks
pose. For instance, in recent work, I argue that the literature on networks’ role in
informal governance overlooks the possibility that contractual networks
exacerbate technological spillovers.32 Having more connections, or becoming
more “embedded” within a network, increases spillover risks. Collaborating with
a company centrally positioned in the network increases the likelihood that
technical information will leak out.33 This is particularly problematic if one’s
current partner can later collaborate with one’s competitors. That is a frequent
occurrence in some markets, such as biopharmaceuticals, where “the pattern of
cross-cutting collaborations often results in a partner on one project being a rival
on another.”34
The idea that network connections can increase spillover risk is a new twist
on an old theme in economic sociology. Granovetter’s classic article on sociallyembedded exchange recognized that network connections can introduce costs,
not just benefits, for parties.35 Uzzi’s subsequent work built upon that foundation,
introducing the idea that networks introduce a “paradox of embeddedness.”36
Analyzing contracting practices in the New York garment industry, Uzzi finds
32. Jennejohn, supra note 11.
33. Matthew Jennejohn, Braided Agreements and New Frontiers for Relational Contract Theory, 45
J. CORP. L. 885, 913 (2020).
34. Powell et al., Network Dynamics and Field Evolution, supra note 10, at 1187.
35. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985) (noting that networks can circulate not only accurate information useful for
policing opportunism but also inaccurate information that undermines informal sanctions).
36. Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of
Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35 (1997); Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of
Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOC. REV.
674 (1996). In its essence, the paradox of embeddedness is similar to the lock-in problem that arises from
the standardization of formal contract terms. Standardization of formal terms can be used to address
common exchange hazards across similar deals, which reduces mundane drafting costs and sends a quality
signal, which in turn may free up resources to fine-tune portions of the agreement addressing novel
contingencies. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, VA. L. REV.
757 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WA. U. L. Q. 347 (1996); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). However, as recent research on the pari passu clause in
sovereign debt indentures has demonstrated, contractual standardization also has a dark side. See
generally MITU GULATI & ROBERT SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013). Terms standardized across a market can
become locked-in as transaction designers reap increasing returns to scale, as parties come to view
deviations from the market standard as signals of non-sophistication, or as the original meaning of a term
becomes lost to memory. In short, standardized provisions can become stuck in the rut of collective action
problems, and, in that respect ,there is a common foundation to the paradox of embeddedness and
boilerplate lock-in.
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evidence that socially embedded ties are useful for building the trust that
minimizes opportunism, facilitating fine-grained information transfer, and
creating joint problem solving arrangements. However, Uzzi also finds that
buyers that were more socially embedded with their suppliers performed poorly
compared to participants with a mix of embedded and arm’s-length contractual
arrangements. Uzzi argues that being densely embedded in a network with many
redundant ties reduces the flow of novel information, because few of the market
players have unique connections. Information becomes ossified, and
collaborations fail due to a “paucity of competence” instead of a surfeit of
opportunism.37
In addition to the risk of technological spillovers, we might add financial
distress as a risk that greater network connectivity raises. While the possibility of
contagion in contractual networks is a familiar topic in the legal literature on
regulation of financial institutions and markets,38 it has been absent in legal
scholarship on contracting in the real economy.39
IV
EMERGENCE, STRUCTURE, AND THE DIFFUSION OF DISRUPTIONS IN A
NETWORK
The idea that contractual networks provide an avenue for financial distress to
spread in a market is intuitive enough to stand on its own. We can model the
spread of a shock with the simplest of diffusion models, and its plausibility is
apparent. The earliest model for studying diffusion, developed by Frank Bass to
study the spread of a technological innovation, does not include any network
characteristics as parameters for diffusion.40 Rather, the Bass model considers
two key rates that contribute to diffusion. One is the rate at which individuals
innovate or spontaneously adopt an innovation, and the other is the rate at which
individuals adopt an innovation because other individuals have. When plotted,
the model generates the familiar “S Curve,” where adoption is gradual early in
the time period, gains speed, and then tapers at the end of the time period.41
Adapting the Bass approach to a contagion setting seems simple enough—the

37. Andrew Schrank & Josh Whitford, The Anatomy of Network Failure, 29 SOC. THEORY 151, 160,
162 (2011).
38. See, e.g., Judge, supra note 4.
39. For early work that explores law’s role in supporting production networks, but that does not
explicitly address contagion problems, see Ariel Porat & Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save Fragile
Spiderless Networks, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party
Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325 (2015).
40. See Frank M. Bass, A New Product Growth for Model Consumer Durables, 15 MGMT. SCI. 215
(1969) (describing the development of a theory of timing of initial purchase of new consumer products);
JACKSON, supra note 6, at 187–88.
41. This is an intuitive pattern as the initial adoption rate is low, because there are few individuals
to adopt the innovation from. The system then enters the linear range, where individuals are able to
adopt both by spontaneous innovation, as well as adoption from others. But as time continues, there are
fewer individuals left to adopt and the adoption rate slows again.
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spread of a shock in a market would largely be captured in that second rate in the
model.
What a simple model like Bass’s does not do well, however, is provide the
granularity we need with respect to how that second rate might vary. For instance,
consider how the Bass model might fare in explaining the propagation of a shock
in the biopharmaceutical network depicted in Figure 3 above. Recall that the
biopharmaceutical network has a core of highly connected nodes and a periphery
of less connected ones, and that there is a relatively high amount of diversity with
respect to connections between the two—that is, nodes in the core have a
relatively high percentage of connections to the periphery, and vice versa. Now
imagine that a shock, such as the labor or supply shortages that occurred in
biopharmaceuticals during the COVID-19 pandemic, occurs.42 The Bass model
does not address the possibility that proximity to others in the network may vary
across nodes—that is, some may be more central and others more peripheral—
thereby affecting the diffusion paths of the shock. Nor does the Bass model allow
us to think about how the location of a shock’s origin in an exchange network—
that is, a shock at the core versus a shock at the periphery—affects propagation.
More nuanced models are necessary to uncover those dynamics.
A. Breadth: How Multisourcing Decisions Shape the Diffusion of Shocks
In recent years, research has begun exploring the spread of financial distress
using a combination of network analysis and game theory.43 Spurred in particular
by the 2008–2009 financial crisis, most of this work has focused upon contagion
in capital markets. More recently, work specifically dedicated to supply chains
has been undertaken.
One of the field’s core insights is that the dynamics of contagion are far more
complicated than our simple intuitions appreciate. At the core of supply chain
fragility is a puzzle. On one hand, increasing links in the network through a
multisourcing strategy is a rational strategy for a buyer to pursue. If one supplier
fails, then it is better to have a second supplier in place who can cover the lost
production capacity. Diversifying risk increases the robustness of the buying firm.
At the same time, more links in the network may also speed up the spread of
a shock. The intuition here is readily apparent in an epidemiological context:
Increasing the connections between people increases the spread of a disease
through a population, while isolating people slows it down. This is, for example,
why public policies mandating or promoting social distancing were adopted
widely during the COVID-19 pandemic. More connections between firms in an
42. See WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING AMERICAN
MANUFACTURING, AND FOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH: 100-DAY REVIEWS UNDER
EXECUTIVE
ORDER
14017
207–49
(June
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6GM-T8FK];
Mariana P. Socal, Joshua M. Sharfstein & Jeremy A. Greene, The Pandemic and the Supply Chain: Gaps
in Pharmaceutical Production and Distribution, 111 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 635 (2021).
43. See generally Matthew O. Jackson & Agathe Pernoud, Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A
Survey, 13 ANN. REV. ECON. 171 (2021).
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exchange network may provide more paths for the effects of a shock to spread.
Putting these two pieces of the puzzle together, prior research has found that
shocks propagate through exchange networks non-monotonically.44 In other
words, increasing links within the network through a multisourcing strategy
increases the likelihood of contagion, but a point arrives where more links in the
network diversify risk sufficiently to prevent propagation of a shock. Exchange
networks have a perverse “goldilocks zone” where there are enough links to
spread a shock but too few links to provide the protection that diversification
promises.
Relatedly, even robust networks may be overcome if the shock is large
enough. Imagine, a well-connected company in an exchange network being
overcome by a large shock despite diversification. In that case, the many
connections in the network then spread the shock far and wide. In this sense,
exchange networks have a tipping point between robustness and fragility, leading
to their paradoxical description as “robust-yet-fragile.”45
Recent studies also provide evidence that the structure of the contractual
connections within a market shape the likelihood of shock propagation. Certain
network structures are more susceptible to cascades than others. In short, the raw
number of links in the network can give us a rough sense of the likelihood of
financial contagion, but more granular analysis of the structure of a network gives
us a better sense of when and from where shocks will spread. This literature offers
several lessons that help to sharpen our understanding of the role that contract
network structure can play in crises.
First, and perhaps mostly clearly, studies have found that, holding other
factors constant, shocks propagate more quickly in some network structures than
others. A theme in a number of studies, for instance, is that a scale-free network
structure is most resilient to shocks compared to other network types. For
example, models of the interbank lending market reveal that the diffusion of
shocks depends upon the structure of the contractual network. A scale-free
network experiences the smallest contagions, though the failure of a central node
can lead to exceptionally large shock propagations. A core-periphery network,
however, where ten large organizations are connected among themselves, and
each of ninety smaller organizations has one random connection to one of the
large core organizations, experienced a swifter spread of financial contagion.46

44. See Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub & Matthew O. Jackson, Financial Networks and
Contagion, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 3115, 3118 (2014) (discussing a general model that produces new
insights regarding financial contagions and cascades of failures among organizations linked through a
network of financial interdependencies).
45. Andrew Haldane, Rethinking the Financial Network, in FRAGILE STABILITÄT – STABILE
FRAGILITÄT 243, 249 (Stephan A. Jansen, Eckhard Schröter & Nico Stehr eds., 2013); Prasanna Gai,
Andrew Haldane & Sujit Kapadia, Complexity, Concentration and Contagion, 58 J. MONETARY ECON.
453 (2011).
46. See Co-Pierre Georg, The Effect of the Interbank Network Structure on Contagion and Common
Shocks, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 2216 (2013) (proposing a dynamic multi-agent model of a banking system
with a central bank).
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Kim, Chen, and Linderman’s study of supply network disruption in a variety
of network structures finds similar evidence.47 Again, in shocks involving either
the failure of a node or the removal of a link, the study found that the scale-free
network structure was by far the most resilient.48 Relatedly, increasing network
density (the number of links among nodes) decreased the network’s resilience.49
Tracing paths from a given raw material supplier, which is the start of a supply
chain, to retailer, which is the end of a supply chain, also revealed that average,
maximum, and minimum path lengths did not predict network resilience.50
Bintrup, Ledwoch, and Barros model supply chain disruptions in the global
automotive industry and reach a similar conclusion.51 Again, an increasingly
interwoven topology is found to make the global automotive supply chains
vulnerable to systemic risk.52 Like a scale-free network, the global automotive
supply network was found to be vulnerable to failures of large companies, but
robust to random failures.53
A second, and related, lesson is that shocks propagate differently when
networks exhibit community structures, such as local clusters of densely
connected nodes. A number of studies examine the effect of homophily on
network structure and the diffusion of shocks. Recall that homophily is present
in a network when nodes in the network tend to prefer connecting to nodes with
similar characteristics. Homophily often leads to a network with few connections
between distinct groups of nodes—that is, a network with discrete subcommunities. Elliott, Golub, and Jackson observed that homophily can lead to
lower contagion due to the severed connections between groups of
organizations.54 While this may increase resilience, Bintrup, Ledwoch, and
Barros note that it does render the network particularly vulnerable to the failure
of “bridging” nodes. Just like scale-free networks are found to be more resilient
but vulnerable to the failure of a central hub, networks with greater community
structure are vulnerable to the failure of a node that bridges two discrete groups.
In that situation, the bridging node is the conduit for contagion that would
otherwise be isolated within a sub-community in the network.
The third lesson is that how a shock diffuses through a network depends in
part on the scale of the shock. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi model
financial contagion not only in a variety of financial network structures but also

47. See Yusoon Kim, Yi-Su Chen & Kevin Linderman, Supply Network Disruption and Resilience:
A Network Structural Perspective, 33 J. OPERATIONS MGMT. 43 (2015) (conceptualizing supply network
disruption and resilience by examining the structural relationships among entities in the network).
48. Id. at 54.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Alexandra Brintrup, Anna Ledwoch & Jose Barros, Topological Robustness of the Global
Automotive Industry, 9 LOGISTICS RSCH. 1 (2016) (highlighting macroscopic and microscopic
characteristics of large-scale interdependent networks).
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id.
54. Elliot et al., supra note 44, at 3142.
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with different scales of shock.55 They find that when a shock is small, then
interdependencies among members of the network is advantageous, as risk is
diversified and easily managed. When shocks are large, however, highly
connected networks are particularly vulnerable to contagion.
Fourth, and finally, even isolated shocks can propagate throughout an
exchange network. Recent work by Elliott, Golub, and Leduc finds that, in
complex markets where supply networks provide multiple essential inputs,
individual firms’ incentives to multisource often lead markets to run too leanly,
bringing them to a “precipice” at which even an isolated failure, such as a factory
fire, at one supplier disrupts a large number of companies in the network.56 In
other words, even in a network with relatively customized sourcing
relationships—where suppliers are providing buyers with bespoke products and
not standardized commodities—a shock can diffuse. A supply network is only as
strong as its weakest link.
In summary, the state of the art in the research on contagion in production
networks paints a complicated picture. Simple diversification strategies that
parties may pursue to hedge against supplier failure may increase the aggregate
risk that a shock will propagate through a market. And even diversification that
is efficient in the occurrence of small shocks may be harmful in the event of a
large shock. Furthermore, the specific choices of partners that parties make affect
the structure of the network that emerges. And variations in network structure
can affect the outcomes of a shock. Creating contractual relationships in discrete
clusters, for instance, or connecting primarily to a few central nodes to form a
scale-free network may make the market more resilient in certain circumstances.
B. Depth: Contract Design as a Tool For Shock Absorption
Although current research on the spread of financial distress adds nuance, it
also leaves an important issue largely unaddressed. Another strategy for reducing
the risk of supplier failure is greater collaboration—or seeking greater depth in
the contractual relationship.57 That is, rather than multisourcing, a buyer may
reduce the scale of its sourcing, or even single source a sub-system, and engage
in relational contracting with that supplier.58
55. See Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Systemic Risk and Stability
in Financial Networks, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 564 (2015) (arguing that the extent of financial contagion
exhibits a form of phase transition: as long as the magnitude of negative shocks affecting financial
institutions are sufficiently small, a more densely connected financial network (corresponding to a more
diversified pattern of interbank liabilities) enhances financial stability).
56. Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub & Matthew W. Leduc, Supply Network Formation and
Fragility 13–14 (Jan. 7, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.03853.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FSC8-VLBB].
57. For insightful commentary on this possibility, see Denis Demblowski, Can Relational Contracts
Remove Supply Chain Rigidity?, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-can-relational-contracts-removesupply-chain-rigidity [https://perma.cc/WZA9-HJHV].
58. For an insightful discussion of when greater relational depth may be pursued, see Juliet P.
Kostritsky, A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach to Understanding Framework Contracts,
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The availability of relational contracting potentially affects shock
propagation. The flexibility that comes through relational contracting may
absorb shocks more readily, nipping shocks in the bud, as it were. The give and
take that a relational contract makes available, even if circumscribed, may be
enough to stop a shock from spreading from a troubled supplier to others. The
opposite is also true: Refusing to be flexible and pushing suppliers on price in an
arm’s-length fashion increases the likelihood of default, as decades of experience
in the automotive industry demonstrate.59
The COVID-19 pandemic has given us many examples of contract design
affecting adjustments in commercial relationships that presumably affected the
likelihood of a shock spreading.60 For instance, the dramatic deal renegotiations
in the mergers and acquisitions market were undertaken within the negotiating
space afforded by merger agreements’ material adverse effect provisions; Tiffany
and Louis Vuitton’s renegotiation being perhaps not only the most public but
also the most fraught.61 A casual study of commentary also suggests that
investment in bilateral governance is a common strategy in situations of distress.
For instance, Deloitte’s advice to OEMs who have a troubled supplier includes
“support, invest, and restore supplier health” and not solely attempting to exit
the supply agreement.62 Law firms advising OEMs in distressed supplier
situations provide guidance on how to design accommodation agreements, which
are used to “prop up the [distressed] supplier.”63
It is important to acknowledge that investing in bilateral governance is not a
viable option in many of the markets the contagion literature discussed above has
studied. The systemically important financial markets that have occupied most
scholarly attention rely heavily on standardized contracts to achieve their massive
scale. In those markets, modeling contagion with the assumption that contracts
are rigid and commoditized is most appropriate. In the supply chain context,

68 AM. U. L. REV. 1621 (2019).
59. For a discussion of how automotive OEMs’ tactics with suppliers were being adopted in the
aerospace industry, see Joseph M. Geraghty, Supply Chain Squeeze: Aerospace OEM’s Rolling Out
Template Used in Auto Supply Market for 30 Plus Years, DAYTON BUS. J. (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/blog/2014/11/
supply-chain-squeeze-aerospace-oem-s-rollingout.html [https://perma.cc/UY3X-Z6JJ].
60. See, e.g., Jonathan Lipson & Norman M. Powell, Contracting COVID: Private Order and Public
Good (Standstill), 76 BUS. LAW. 437 (2021) (exploring the important role that private ordering can play
through the use of standstill/forbearance agreements).
61. See, e.g., Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko & Eric Talley, Contractual Evolution 1–4 (Ctr. for
L. & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 654, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810214 [https://perma.cc/F94T-WA8Q].
62. REED BINGAMAN, LAURENT BECHER, MICHAEL HELD, SEAN MCPHERSON, RAM SRIRAM &
RAJ IYER, YOU ARE ONLY AS STRONG AS YOUR WEAKEST LINK: WHY MANUFACTURERS SHOULD
MONITOR
THEIR
SUPPLIERS’
HEALTH
5
(Deloitte
ed.,
2012),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-auto-distressedsupplier%20management-03052013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNG2-TPND].
63. Ann Marie Uetz & Christopher R. Boll, Working with Distressed Automotive Suppliers, FOLEY
& LARDNER (June 9, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/06/considerationsfinancially-distressed-suppliers [https://perma.cc/5B22-MGNJ]; see also Lipson & Powell, supra note 60.
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however, customizing contractual governance to include relational flexibility is a
more realistic option.
Recognizing the possibility that contract design may affect the diffusion of
shocks opens two avenues for future research. The first avenue is in legal
scholarship. It invites contract scholars to consider the diffusion effects of
contracting parties’ governance choices. Since the welfare-oriented approach of
law and economics came to dominate contracts scholarship in the 1980s and
1990s, scholarship on contract design has focused squarely on how design choices
affect parties’ incentives to invest. That is, social benefit and harm are understood
through the lens of underinvestment. Contracts’ role in propagating diffusion
adds a new frame for understanding contracting’s role in affecting social welfare.
The effect of this new frame may be felt most immediately in the new
scholarship on the role of networks in supporting informal sanctions. In that
scholarship, greater network connections are seen as unalloyed benefits—the
more connected a network, the faster reputational information spreads. The
possibility that networks may also hasten the diffusion of contagion is a reason to
be less sanguine about the promise of contractual networks. In that respect, the
prospect of contagion complements the recent work on networks’ roles in
facilitating technological spillovers: Not only do contractual networks increase
technological externalities, they also heighten the risk that financial distress
spreads to third parties.
The second avenue is found in the social science research that models
diffusion, as outlined above. One implication of the insight that contract design
may affect shock propagation is that greater attention must be paid to link
characteristics in diffusion models. In supply chains, where contracts may fall
anywhere along a continuum between relational and arm’s-length arrangements,
links can have different qualities. Diffusion models should be designed to
incorporate this insight, shedding light on how shocks, large and small, might
spread depending on the nature of the contracts connecting participants in the
market. In short, including more nuanced link characteristics in contagion
modeling promises to improve our understanding of how shocks spread.
C. The Interaction Between Breadth And Depth
Importantly, parties’ breadth and depth strategies for limiting the harm of
contagion are interrelated. This interrelationship arises, for instance, because
relational contracting is typically not undertaken at the same scale as arm’slength sourcing.64 Deepening a contractual relationship consumes internal
resources, leading to fewer, but deeper, supplier connections. This in turn reduces
the number of contractual links in an exchange network and affects overall
network structure. On the other hand, the choice to broaden one’s sourcing
relationships often carries with it the implicit decision to reduce the extent of
64. This, of course, assumes that one’s investment in internal governance capacity is held constant.
One may both broaden and deepen one’s contractual relationships simultaneously if one is also willing
to make greater investments in that internal capacity.
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relational governance. In either respect, the specifics of microlevel contract
design have important implications for macrolevel contagion patterns.
V
CONCLUSION: CONTINGENT INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A HETEROGENEOUS
ECONOMY
Identifying the transactional dynamics of market fragility raises a number of
implications for future research and policy. Perhaps the most obvious implication
is the need for further empirical analysis of shock propagation in supply chains,
which significantly lags adjacent work studying financial markets. On the legal
side of the academic division of labor, developing a theory of contract design and
enforcement that includes externalities such as the spread of shocks within an
exchange network is also a priority. Subject to the further refinement that this
research will provide, the following three policy implications also arise.
First, the research already undertaken suggests that exchange networks are
highly heterogeneous in their structures, and that shocks propagate differently
across networks due to those different structures and a variety of other factors.
That diversity, in turn, suggests that any regulatory response tasked with
addressing the spread of distress within a network will have to be sufficiently
flexible to tailor its intervention to a meaningful extent to the network type in
which it is operating. The threshold requirement for success, then, is identifying
and understanding the structure of exchange networks, and how contagion
spreads differently through them.65 Without such an ability, any regulatory
intervention will be like flying an airplane without instrumentation.
Second, building regulatory capacity to analyze network structure and
dynamics, particularly in the heat of a crisis, is a long-term project, if such would
be politically feasible at all. The institutional investment required for the
administrative state to play such a role raises the question of whether alternative
methods might be used. Of course, the private sector offers services and
technology for supply chain monitoring, which can improve visibility for
companies in a supply chain and allow them to better anticipate the spread of a
shock. At the same time, enhanced visibility, alone, certainly was not enough to
prevent the diffusion of COVID-19’s disruption around the globe. This raises the
question of whether a middle ground might be possible—a distributed response
that nonetheless has the resources and imprimatur of the state.
Here, contract law’s excusal doctrines are an intriguing possibility. To deploy
them accurately, however, would require (1) modeling how excusing a parties’
performance obligation affects shock propagation among other companies under
stress in a dynamic network; (2) likely refashioning the triggers for excusal to
incorporate contagion risk, and not just contracting parties’ mistakes about
65. For an illustrative proposal on how to use simple centrality measures to steer intervention in
financial markets, see Luca Enriques, Alessandro Romano & Thom Wetzer, Network-Sensitive Financial
Regulation, 45 J. CORP. L. 351–98 (2020).
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fundamental assumptions of their agreements; (3) increasing generalist courts’
ability to understand and apply excusal doctrines in crisis settings; and (4)
providing the resources necessary to the judiciary to expedite dispute resolution
during a crisis. Even if a decentralized solution is less costly than more centralized
regulatory intervention, those four factors are nevertheless tall orders.66
This leads us to the third implication, which is that perhaps the most costeffective way of addressing the spread of shocks through the real economy is
improving contract design. Encouraging investment in bilateral governance may
provide more contractual shock absorbers throughout an exchange network, for
instance. Or perhaps directing collaboration toward particular partners can
create more resilient network structures in the first place. The most cost-effective
fix may come from an unlikely place: Transactional lawyers.

66. For further thoughtful discussion on courts’ capabilities in this regard, see Anthony Casey &
Anthony Niblett, The Limits of Public Contract Law, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 51.

